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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a breach of contract claim and declaratory judgment action that was 
brought by Plaintiff-Respondent Secured Investment Corp. ("SIC"), which is a Wyoming 
corporation, against Defendant-Appellant Myers Executive Building, LLC ("Myers"), which is a 
Washington limited liability company. The case was filed by SIC in the District Court of the 
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai. SIC's claims were 
that Myers breached a contract, for which SIC was entitled to damages, and to demand enforcement 
of the arbitration clause as set forth in the contract. The District Court entered a default judgment 
against Myers and awarded SIC damages in the amount of$91,604.81 and attorneys' fees and costs 
in the amount of$8,504.83. The District Court never entered judgment on the declaratory judgment 
action to enforce the arbitration clause. 
Myers moved to set aside the default judgment on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, 
insufficiency of service of process, failure to give three days' notice, and excusable neglect and 
mistake, and on the basis that the judgment was not final because the declaratory judgment action 
had not been resolved. 
The District Court denied Myers's motion to set aside the default judgment and this 
appeal followed. 
Appellant's Opening Brief - Page 1 
I\10535.002\PLD\Appellant's Opening Brief 151214.doc 
B. Proceedings Before The District Court. 
On December 4, 2014, SIC filed its Complaint ("Complaint") against Myers. R. 6-16. 
On January 7, 2015, SIC filed a Motion For Leave to Serve Mvers Executive Building, LLC By 
Publication ("Motion to Publish"). R. 20-22. SIC's Motion To Publish was supported by the 
Affidavit of William J. Farmin in Support of Motion For Service Bv Publication [R. 23-25], 
the Affidavit of Michael G. Schmidt in Support of Motion For Service Bv Publication [F. 26-27], 
and the Affidavit of Terri Boyd-Davis in Support of Motion For Service By Publication [R. 28-33]. 
On January 8, 2015, the District Court entered an Order For Service Upon Myers Executive 
Building, LLC By Publication ("Order For Publication"). R. 34-35. 
Notice of the lawsuit was published in The Puyallup Herald, a daily newspaper printed and 
published in the City of Tacoma, County of Pierce, State of Washington, on four different occasions 
between January 14, 2015 and February 4, 2015. R. 38. 
On March 16, 2015, SIC filed its Application For Entry of Default ("Application"). R. 43-44. 
The Application was supported by the Affidavit of Michael G. Schmidt in Support of Application 
For Entry of Default. R. 39-42. On March 18, 2015, an Order For Entry of Default was entered by 
the District Court. R. 45-46. On March 18, 2015, a Default Judgment ("Default Judgment") was 
entered by the District Court in favor of SIC and against Myers in the amount of $100,109.64. 
R. 47-48. 
Following entry of the Default Judgment, on April 6, 2015, Myers filed a Notice of 
Appearance. R. 51-52. On April 9, 2015, Myers served its Notice of Hearing on Motion to 
Set Aside Default, noticing a hearing for May 7, 2015, at 3:00 p.m. PDST (the earliest possible date 
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District Court had available). R. 53-54. On April 2015, Myers filed its Motion to Set Aside 
Aside Default Judgment. R. 55-67. The Motion To Set Aside Default, based upon lack 
of jurisdiction, insufficiency of service, failure to give three days' notice, excusable neglect 
and mistake, and lack of a final judgment [R. 49-59, 55-67], was supported by the Declaration of 
William Bernard in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment [R. 68-74], and the 
Declaration of Linda Youngberg in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
("Youngberg Dec.") [R. 75-135]. 
On April 30, 2015, SIC filed an Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
[R. 152-173], which was supported by the Declaration of Jason Powell in Support of Opposition to 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment [R. 174-188], the Declaration of Michael G. Schmidt in 
Support of Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment [R. 189-195], the Declaration of 
Terri Boyd-Davis in Support of Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment [R. 143-148], 
and the Declaration of William Halls in Support of Opposition to Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment [R. 149-151]. 
On May 6, 2015, Myers filed its Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment [R. 196-199] and the Supplemental Declaration of 
William F. Bernard in Support of Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment [R. 200-203]. 
On May 12, 2015, the District Court entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment ("Order Denying Motion to Set Aside"). R. 204-205. The Order Denying 
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to Set Aside was based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law that were orally 
on record at the hearing on May 7, 2015. Transcript 35, I. L 9. 
On June 17, 2015, Myers timely filed its Notice of Appeal. R. 216-222. 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
Since March 2014, before this lawsuit was filed in Idaho, SIC and Myers had been involved 
in ongoing litigation against one another in California over a contract similar to the one in question 
in this case. R. 69-74, 77 (if 11 ). In the California case, both parties were represented by counsel. 
Id. In the California litigation, Myers was actively prosecuting its case and defending against claims 
and defenses raised by SIC. Id. The parties were involved in discovery and depositions. Id. 
Before the Idaho Complaint was filed, SIC's Idaho attorneys were aware that Meyers was 
represented by California counsel and that there was pending litigation between the parties 
in California. R. 69-74; 77-78 (':l':l 11-12); 150 (':! 5); 17 5 (':!if 3-7); 191-192 (i[':l 7-8). 
In fact, with regard to the contract at issue in this case, in August 2014 (before this lawsuit 
was filed), SIC' s attorneys in Montana had demanded arbitration through the American Arbitration 
Association [R. 185-186] and there was a dispute as to whether SIC had complied with the contract 
before demanding arbitration [R. 178]. SIC had failed to supply Myers with documents supporting 
its claim before filing for arbitration. Id. 
On December 4, 2014, SIC filed its Complaint and made one attempt to personally 
serve Myers, a Washington limited liability company, at its business address and one attempt at a 
secondary address. R. 24. Rather than contact Myers's California attorneys and inform them a 
lawsuit had been filed and inquire whether they would accept service, on January 7, 2015, 
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SIC moved the District Court to serve by publication. R. 192 Cir 9). The District Court granted SIC's 
to Publish on January 8, 2015. R. 34-35. 
The affidavits submitted to the District Court to obtain an order for service by publication 
made no reference to the California litigation or that SIC was involved in other litigation 
in California or that Meyers was represented by counsel. R. 26-27. Further, SIC failed to represent 
to the District Court that it could not find a business agent for Myers in Idaho upon which to 
effectuate service. id. 
In or about mid-January 2015, counsel for SIC sent the Summons and Complaint via email to 
Linda Youngberg, Myers's managing member. R. 78. Ms. Youngberg immediately contacted her 
California attorney, William F. Bernard. Id. Ms. Youngberg was informed by Mr. Bernard that 
service by email was not effective. Id. On January 27, 2015, Mr. Bernard contacted SIC's Idaho 
attorney and left a voice message advising that Myers intended to defend the Complaint and also 
intended to seek arbitration as set forth in the underlying contract at issue. R. 69-70 cirir 3-5). 
There is no dispute that the telephone call was made by Mr. Bernard or that the message was 
received by SIC's Idaho counsel. Id.; 191 cir,r 7-8). Rather than return the telephone call, SIC sought 
and obtained the Default Judgment without a three-day notice as required by Rule 55(b )(2) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P."). R. 192 (,I 9). 
On March 9, 2015, the deposition of Lee Arnold, the President of SIC, was held in San Jose, 
California, in the California litigation. R. 70 Cir 7). Ms. Youngberg attended that deposition. Id. 
No attempt was made to serve Ms. Youngberg at that deposition. Id. 
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The Default Judgment was entered March 18, 2015 and the District Court awarded SIC 
$1 109.64 in damages. 47-48. The claim for a declaratory judgment action prayed for by SIC 
was never addressed by the District Court. Id. 
On or about March 26, 2015, upon receiving the Default Judgment, Ms. Youngberg retained 
Idaho counsel (within one week from entry of the Default Judgment). R. 79. Myers's counsel 
contacted the District Court to secure the earliest available date for a hearing on the Motion To Set 
Aside Default and was provided May 7, 2015, at 3:00 p.m. PDST. R. 53, 56. On or about 
April 9, 2015, Myers filed and served its Notice of Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Default. 
R. 53-54. The moving papers were filed on April 22, 2015 in accordance with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). 
R. 55-56. 
On May 12, 2015, the District Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside. 
R. 204-205. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in denying Myers's Motion To Set Aside the 
Default Judgment? 
2. Did the District Court err in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to SIC? 
3. This Court should award Myers's attorneys' fees and costs under Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54. 
II II 
II I I 
Appellant's Opening Brief - Page 6 




The District Court Erred In Not Setting Aside The Default Judgment Pursuant To 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
Whether a judgment is void and should be set aside under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is subject to 
de nova review. Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,576 (2009); lvfcDavidv. Kiroglu, 155 Idaho 49, 50 
(Ct.App. 2013); Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 58 (1985). Failure to give three days' 
notice under I.R.C.P. 55(b )(2) is subject to abuse of discretion review. Afeyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 
283, 284 (2009). 
Judgments by default are not favored in Idaho. Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co., 104 Idaho 727 
(Idaho App. 1983 ). "[T]he general rule inclines toward granting relief from defaults to bring about a 
judgment on the merits." Mead v. Citizen's Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 78 Idaho 63, 66 (1956). 
"Because judgments by default are not favored, relief should be granted in doubtful cases in order to 
decide the case on the merits." Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Real Property Situated in County 
o.f Cassia, 144 Idaho 60 (2007), citing Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706 (2005). 





For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, 
if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b ). 
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LR.C.P. 60(b) provides: 
I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; ... ( 4) the judgment is void; ... 
To find that a default judgment is void, there generally must be some defect in the 
court's authority to enter judgment. Catledge v. Transport Tire Co .. Inc., I 07 Idaho 602 (1984); 
Puphal v. Puphal, I 05 Idaho 312 (1983). The court must either lack personal jurisdiction, 
subject matter jurisdiction, or the parties or the court must have acted in a manner inconsistent with 
the due process of law. Id. Where a party has not been served with process or was improperly 
served with process, the judgment against a party is void. Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86 (1990). 
Lack of personal jurisdiction renders a default judgment void. Knight Ins., Inc., 109 Idaho at 59. 
When a party fails to give the three-day notice as required under I.R.C.P. 55, a default judgment 
is voidable. Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288; Knight Ins., Inc., 109 Idaho at 59; Nickels v. Durbano, 
118 Idaho 198, 201 (Idaho App. 1990); Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57 (1983). In this case, 
the Default Judgment suffers from all three defects and should have been set aside. 
II I I 
II// 
II I I 
// II 
II II 
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L The Default Judgment is Void Because SIC Failed to Give Three Days' Written 
Notice Before Taking a Default. 
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) provides: 
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 
(2) Default Judgment by the Court~Persons Exempt 
From . .. If the party against whom judgment by 
default is sought has appeared in the action, the party 
(or, if appearing by representative, the party's 
representative) shall be served with VvTitten notice of 
the application for judgment at least three (3) days 
prior to the hearing on such application. 
Entering a default judgment without the three-day written notice as required by 
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) violates due process. In In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875 (91h Cir. 1993), 
the court ruled that the " ... failure to give required Rule 55(b )(2) notice violated due process, 
and the judgment should be vacated." Failure to give the required notice is generally regarded as a 
serious procedural irregularity. Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 665 (1983), disapproved on 
other grounds. In Farber v. Howell, the plaintiff failed to give the three-day notice as required by 
I.R.C.P. 55(b )(2). The Idaho Supreme Court held that the "default order is voidable for failure to 
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b )(2)" and issued instructions to the district court to 
set aside the default judgment. Farber, 105 Idaho at 59. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has broadly defined the "appearance" required to trigger the 
three-day notice requirement in I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) and has held that an appearance is not limited to a 
formal court appearance. Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935 (1985); Newbold, 
105 Idaho at 665. "Conduct on the part of the defendant which indicates an intent to defend against 
the action can constitute an appearance within the meaning of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)." Newbold, 
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Idaho at 665. "Sufficient contacts between attorneys may provide the necessary indicia of an 
to defend. Id., citing Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978). 
I.R.C.P. 55(b )(2) is intended to afford an extra measure of protection to parties who 
have in some way shown an intention to defend their interests in an action. Newbold, 105 Idaho 
at 665. The court in Nickels stated that "some correspondence, participation in proceedings, 
or discussions acknowledging the existence of a pending legal action which indicate an intent to 
defend are central to a holding that an appearance has been made in the action." Nickels, 118 Idaho 
at 202-03. 
The policy underlying the three days' notice rule is explained in 6 Moore's 
Federal Practice ir 55.05(3) (2d Ed. 1982). "A party may be deemed to have filed an appearance 
when there have been contacts between the plaintiff and the defaulting party that indicate the 
defaulting party intends to defend the suit." Id. 
Given the approach, [preference for resolution of litigation on 
the merits and not based on technical pleading rules] the 
default judgment must normally be viewed as available only 
when the adversary process has been halted because of an 
essentially unresponsive party. In that instance, the diligent 
party must be protected lest he be faced with interminable 
delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights. The default 
judgment remedy serves as such a protection. Furthermore, 
the possibility of a default is a deterrent to those parties who 
choose delay as part of their litigative strategy. The notice 
requirement contained in Rule 55(b)(2) is, however, a device 
intended to protect those parties who, although delaying in a 
formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the twenty-day 
period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear 
purpose to defend the suit. [Emphasis added.] 
HF. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (1970). 
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In this instance, before the Idaho lawsuit was filed, SIC and Myers had been involved 
ongoing litigation against one another in California a similar matter. R. 69-74, 77. Both parties 
were represented by counsel. Id. Before SIC filed its lawsuit in Idaho, Myers was actively 
prosecuting its case in California and defending against claims and defenses raised by SIC in a 
similar matter. Id. The parties were involved in discovery and depositions. With regard to 
this matter, before this lawsuit was filed, the parties were engaging in the arbitration process and 
both parties were represented by counsel. R. 178, 185-186. 
On or about January 27, 2015, Ms. Youngberg received the Summons and Complaint 
via email. Mr. Bernard (Myers's California attorney) contacted SIC's Idaho attorney and left a 
message concerning the Complaint; Myers's intent to defend the case; and Myers's intent to seek 
arbitration as set forth in the underlying contract at issue. R. 69-70. The telephone call from 
Mr. Bernard to Mr. Schmidt is not in dispute. R. 69-70, 191. Taken together, the facts demonstrate 
that Myers had "appeared" in the Idaho case for purposes ofl.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). However, rather than 
return Mr. Bernard's telephone call, SIC sought and obtained the Default Judgment without giving a 
three-day notice as required by I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). The District Court abused its discretion in 
finding that three days' notice was not required under these circumstances. On this basis, 
the Default Judgment should be set aside. 
II I I 
II I I 
II II 
II I I 
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2, The Default Judgment is Void Because The District Court Lacked Personal 
Jurisdiction. 
Idaho "courts can properly exercise jurisdiction over an individual not subject to 
general jurisdiction only where there is a legal basis for the assertion ofextraterritorial jurisdiction." 
Afann v. Coonrod, 125 Idaho 537,539 (1994). "For an Idaho court to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state defendant, 'two criteria must be met, the act giving rise to the cause of action 
was wholly within the scope of the long arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process 
must be met." McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491 (2002); Profits Plus Capital 
Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873 (2014). 
Idaho Code § 5-514 provides for long arm jurisdiction, and states: 
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter 
enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, 
association or corporation, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as 
to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of 
said acts: 
(a) The transaction of any business within this state 
which is hereby defined as the doing of any act for the 
purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or 
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact 
or enhance the business purpose or objective or any 
part thereof of such person, firm, company, 
association or corporation; 
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state; 
( c) The ownership, use or possession of any real property 
situate within this state; 
( d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting; ... 
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this case, there were no facts set forth in the Complaint or otherwise which give 
to personal jurisdiction against Myers Executive Building. LLC a Washington limited 
liability company, and there are no facts which establish minimum contacts with the State of Idaho or 
application of Idaho's long arm statute. R. 8-19. In its Complaint, SIC only alleges that SIC is a 
Wyoming corporation conducting business in Kootenai County, Idaho [R. 6 (i! l)]; that Myers is a 
Washington corporation [R. 7 (il 3)]; and, that, generally, jurisdiction is proper over subject matter 
and the parties [R. 7 (i! 5)]. There is nothing in the Complaint that establishes Myers did anything 
within the State of Idaho to subject it to the District Court's jurisdiction. R. 8-19. All of the 
allegations in the Complaint involve a contract entered into between the parties for a loan made in 
Minnesota and a lawsuit filed in Minnesota concerning a contract dealing with real property in 
Minnesota. Id. Other than the fact that SIC (a Wyoming corporation) operates a business in Idaho 
and the contract in question states that it will be interpreted in accordance with Idaho law, Idaho has 
no ties to this case. 
Myers did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Idaho to be subject to 
jurisdiction under Idaho's long arm statute; thus, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Myers to 
enter the Default Judgment. The District Court, rather than deciding the issue of jurisdiction, 
ruled that Myers had waived jurisdiction under I.R.C.P. 12(g)(l) by filing the Motion To Set 
Aside Default. Tr. p. 41, 11. 6-18. This was an error. Myers clearly raised the issue of jurisdiction 
and service of process in its Motion To Set Aside Default filed on April 22, 2015 [R. 49-50, 55-66], 
which is permitted by I.C.R.P. 12(g)(l). 
Appellant's Opening Brief - Page 13 
1:\10535.002\PLD\Appellant's Opening Brief 151214.doc 
Default Judgement should have been set aside. Likewise, the District Court's 
to not set aside the Default Judgment should be reversed. 
3. The Default Judgment is Void Because Mvers \Vas Not Properly Served. 
Idaho Code § 5-515 provides: 
Service of process upon any such person, firm, company, 
association or corporation who is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state, as provided herein, may be made by 
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside 
the state with the same force and effect as though summons 
had been personally served within this state. 
I.R.C.P. 4(d)(4) provides that foreign corporations and associations must be served 
by personal, in-hand service. 
Idaho Code§ 5-508 provides that" ... a foreign corporation having no managing or 
business agent, cashier or secretary within this state, ... " may be served by publication upon filing 
an affidavit setting forth the facts required under Idaho Code § 5-508. 
Myers was never personally served with the Summons or Complaint. R. 78 (if 2). 
Instead, SIC filed affidavits with the District Court to obtain service by publication. R. 23-33. 
SI C's affidavits in support of its Application were defective. In particular, contrary to Idaho Code 
§ 5-508, the affidavits did not set forth that Myers does not have a business agent, manager or cashier 
that could be found within Idaho. Id. Such a statement is required under Idaho Code § 5-508; 
thus, the affidavits submitted to the District Court were defective and the District Court should not 
have ordered service by publication. 
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Moreover, SIC did the absolute minimum in its attempts to effectuate personal service 
""'T"'r" seeking to publish and violated fundamental notions due process. According to the 
process server's affidavit of non-service, only one attempt was made to serve Myers at its place 
of business. R. 24. SIC was aware that Linda Youngberg was the registered agent and the managing 
member of Myers. R. 21. Yet, SIC made no attempt to serve Ms. Youngberg directly during the 
deposition of Lee Arnold, which took place on March 9, 2015 in the California case. R. 70-71, 77. 
Likewise, despite the fact SIC knew Myers was represented by Mr. Bernard, SIC made no attempt to 
serve Mr. Bernard at the March 9 deposition or inform anyone that service by publication had been 
ordered by the District Court and the publication process had commenced. R. 21, 70-71, 77-78. 
SIC' s efforts to serve Myers by in-hand service did not satisfy the requirements of due process and 
did not justify an order to serve by publication. 
The efforts expended by SIC to personally serve Myers were deficient and should not 
have given rise to an order to serve by publication. The Order For Service By Publication should not 
have been issued as the evidence presented to the District Court did not meet the requirements of 
Idaho Code§ 5-508. SIC's service by publication was defective, rendering the Default Judgment 
void. The Default Judgment should have been set aside by the District Court. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Setting Aside The Default Judgment 
Due To Mistake, Surprise Or Excusable Neglect Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l). 
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l), is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Berg, 147 Idaho at 576. 
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set aside a default judgment, the moving party must (1) satisfy at least one of the criteria 
l ): allege which, if established, would constitute a 
defense to the action. Hearst Corp. v. Keller, I 00 Idaho 10 (1979); Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co., 
104 Idaho 727 (Ct.App.1983). 
To obtain relief from a default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect, the moving 
party must demonstrate that his conduct was of a type expected from a reasonably prudent person 
under the circumstances. Montane Resource Associates v. Greene, 132 Idaho 458, 462 (1999), 
citing Hearst Corp., 100 Idaho at 11; see also Gro-A1or, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho 1020 
(Idaho App. 1985). "A mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside a default judgment must be of fact 
and not of law." Hearst Corp., 100 Idaho at 11. 
In addition to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b ), the moving party must also plead facts 
which, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the action. Idaho State Police ex rel. 
Russell v. Real Property Situated in County of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60 (2007); Hearst Corp., 100 Idaho 
at 12. "The meritorious defense requirement is a pleading requirement, not a burden of proof." 
Idaho State Police ex rel. Russel, 144 Idaho 60. "A meritorious defense to set aside a 
default judgment does not require that the actual defense be proven; all that is required is that the 
moving party pied facts that if proven, would constitute a potential defense." Hearst Corp., 
100 Idaho at 12. 
In this instance, Ms. Youngberg, after receiving the Complaint via email, contacted her 
California counsel and she was informed that service by email was not sufficient and that he would 
contact SIC' s Idaho attorney, which he did. Ms. Youngberg had no reason to believe a default would 
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be sought or taken if an answer was not immediately filed. She did not even believe that she had 
been served. Ms. Youngberg' s actions were reasonable and good cause exists to set aside the 
Default Judgment. Rather than focus on Ms. Youngberg's excusable neglect, the District Court 
focused on Mr. Bernard's actions to deny Myers' s Motion to Set Aside Default. The District Court 
ruled: 
In this case, the Court cannot find and does not find the defendant's 
actions or inaction to file - I should say, its inaction to file an answer 
was the result of a mistake, some inadvertent surprise, or 
excusable neglect. 
A prudent person who had actual knowledge of the lawsuit, as was 
the situation by the defendant and its California counsel, would have 
done more than make one phone call and then wait to see if the 
plaintiff would respond to that phone call. 
Again, it would have been their burden to go and either actually talk 
to Plaintiff's counsel in this matter, find some way, a letter, 
something else, but in this instance, as stated, there is a dispute of 
facts of what actually was said other than the fact that there was a 
phone call made. 
Tr. p. 40, 11. 9-24. The District Court abused its discretion. The District Court never examined 
whether Ms. Youngberg failed to file a timely answer because of her (Myers's) excusable negligence. 
Instead, the District Court looked at what Myers's California counsel did or failed to do after the 
Summons and Complaint were sent via email. The District Court should have considered whether 
Ms. Youngberg acted reasonably, not whether her California counsel acted reasonably. This was an 
abuse of discretion, as the District Court applied the incorrect legal standard. 
Further, there are issues to be litigated in the case. First, as set forth in the letter from 
William Halls to SIC, there are significant questions concerning the Minnesota transaction that 
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tr.r'rnf'•rl the basis for SIC's suit against Myers. R. 70-73. Second, there \Vere questions concerning 
s jurisdiction over Myers. Third, Myers denies that there was any agreement to 
pay the amounts claimed by SIC as alleged in the Complaint, and set forth those reasons in the 
Youngberg Dec. R. 75-79. Fourth, there are questions concerning the enforceability of the 
"hold harmless" agreement in the underlying contract because it was SIC's conduct that gave rise to 
the Minnesota lawsuit. Id.; R. 70-74 (,r,r 6-7). Finally, the amount claimed by SIC was inflated. 
R. 77 (,r 9); I 02-112. As is set forth in the Youngberg Dec., the amount originally claimed by SIC 
was approximately $40,000.00, not the $100,109.64 stated in the Default Judgment entered by the 
District Court. Id. 
The District Court's decision to not set aside the Default Judgment should be reversed and 
this matter remanded for further proceedings. 
C. The Default Judgment Was Not Final Under I.R.C.P. 54(a) And Should Be Remanded. 
As part of SIC's Complaint, SIC sought a declaratory judgment referring the matter 
to arbitration. That issue was never resolved by the District Court. Under I.R.C.P. 54(a), the 
Default Judgment was not final; thus, the matter should be remanded to determine if the case should 
have been arbitrated pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
D. The District Court Should Not Have Awarded SIC Attorneys' Fees And Costs. 
Based upon the points and authorities set forth in this briet~ the District Court's award of 
attorneys' fees and costs to SIC should be reversed, as the Default Judgment should have been 
set aside. 
Appellant's Opening Brief - Page 18 
1:110535,002\PLD\Appellant's Opening Brief l 5 !214.doc 
E. This Court Should Award Myers's Attorneys' Fees And Costs On Appeal. 
Based upon Idaho Code § I 120(3 ), Myers respectfully requests an award of its 
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Myers has established that the contacts between Myers's attorney(s) and SIC's attorney(s) 
was an appearance within the meaning of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). SIC's failure to give Myers 
three days' notice, the District Court's lack of personal jurisdiction and the insufficiency of service 
render the Default Judgment void. Moreover, Myers established both mistake and excusable neglect 
and pled facts which constitute a meritorious defense. The District Court abused its discretion. 
Therefore, Myers respectfully requests that the Default Judgment be deemed void, that the 
Default Judgment be reversed, and that this matter be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 181h day of December 2015. 
McCONNELL WAGNER SYKES & ST ACEY PLLC 
BY: 
Appellant Myers Executive Building, LLC 
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